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Inter-American Development Bank
The IADB held its sixteenth Annual Meeting in Cancin, Mexico, during the
week of May 17, 1976. The meeting, appropriately convened in the recently
completed elaborate tourism complex financed in part by the Bank, marked
several new developments in IADB's history.
Agricultural Development
As is customary, the meeting received the Annual Report for 1975. It came as
no surprise that the total of loans authorized in 1975, amounting to $1.375
billion, set a new record. Nor did the breakdown of $646.2 million from
ordinary capital resources ("hard loans"), $634.2 million from the Fund for
Special Operations ("soft loans"), $83.2 million from the Venezuelan Trust
Fund and $11.4 million from other resources, depart significantly from
established patterns.
Decidedly interesting, however, is a pronounced shift in emphasis in the
range of economic sectors that benefited from the Bank's infusion of resources.
Heading the list of these sectors in 1975 is Agriculture, for which $332 million
were authorized. As a result, the cumulative total for authorized loans to
Agriculture has nudged out of first place the cumulative total of approved loans
to the Electric Power sector. A significant portion of the Agriculture sector loans
took the form of financing farm credit programs, rural savings and loan
*Member of the firm of Foss, Schuman & Drake, Chicago, Illinois.
tMember of the firm of Muir and Stolper, Washington, D.C.
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cooperatives and similar efforts, essential not only to stimulate productivity but
also to facilitate land reform.
The Bank's Annual Meeting was immediately preceded in Canctin by the first
meeting of the International Group for Agricultural Development in Latin
America (IGAD/LA). This new consultative group, organized under the
auspices of IADB, includes in its membership the IADB itself, the World Bank,
OAS, ECLA, the UN Development Program, AID, the Canadian International
Development Agency, FAO, the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural
Sciences, the Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment, the Ford
Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The objectives of IGAD/LA are
said to be:
(a) To develop a better understanding of agricultural problems and oppor-
tunities common to the regional or subregional groups.
(b) To promote and channel toward the agriculture of Latin American
countries an increased and better coordinated flow of external and
internal public and private resources for technical and financial coopera-
tion, aimed at food production and rural development.
(c) To improve coordination among the major agencies in order to enhance
the quality of the financial and technical cooperation currently being pro-
vided in Latin America.
At least initially, IGAD/LA is expected to emphasize the aspects of manage-
ment personnel training, international coordination of research, and assistance
in the preparation of specific agricultural investment programs for selected
geographic areas.
The first IGAD/LA meeting in Cancun' was attended by agriculture ministers
or comparable officials of the several member countries. While it would be
difficult to define any concrete accomplishment of this meeting, it appears that
another international forum has been created to concentrate attention
specifically on a problem area in which there are also great opportunities for
significant progress in Latin America.
Inter-Regional Membership-Capital Increase
The Cancun meeting was attended by, among others, representatives of the
twelve countries outside the region who signed the Declaration of Madrid in
December, 1974 (See 9 The International Lawyer, Fall, 1975). United States
congressional action on the amendments to the Agreement Establishing the Bank
was completed while the Cancuil meeting was in progress.
At a ceremony held in Washington on July 9, nine of the prospective non-
regional members formally took up their membership in the Bank. The
memberships of Austria, the Netherlands and Italy still await completion of
their internal constitutional processes; France, which had not been a signatory
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of the Declaration of Madrid, expressed its intention to join. In the meantime,
the regional memberships of the Bahamas and Guyana also became effective.
This combination of actions will have the following results:
Ordinary capital. IADB's subscribed ordinary capital has been increased
by $4 billion-from $5,964,957,000 to $9,964,957,000. Of the addition, up
to $344 million will be paid in over the next three years, and $3,656 million
will be callable, to be subscribed over the next three years. The United States
share of the $4 billion increase will be $1.2 billion, or 30 percent ($120 million
paid in and $1.08 billion callable).
After completion of the $4 billion increase in 1978, the members are com-
mitted to a further $1.3 billion increase in the callable capital in 1979. The
United States share of this further increase will be $450 million, or 34.6 percent.
It will be remembered that the "callable capital" amounts in effect to
members' guarantees of the Bank's borrowings in the international capital
markets. These guarantees have never been invoked and, in the light of the
Bank's liquidity and the quality of its loan portfolio, it is not expected that they
ever will be.
Inter-regional capital. The new inter-regional capital stock will provide a
separate convertible currency fund to support international capital market
borrowings. To this class of capital the non-regionals are expected to sub-
scribe $372,712,000 ($61,475,000 paid in over three years and $311,237,000
callable).
Actually, the inter-regional capital stock will also be open for subscription by
present members. Of the $1,530,000,000 callable capital subscriptions to be
made by the United States, as mentioned above, $930 million will be sub-
scribed to the inter-regional capital stock; a portion of the Canadian and Latin
American subscriptions will similarly be made to this new class of stock.
Fund for Special Operations. The Bank's "soft loan window," which does not
have access to outside borrowing, will also benefit from substantial new fund-
ing. In addition to the $4,395 million heretofore in the Fund, a further $1,045
million will be paid in over the next three years. Of this amount, $600 million
will come from the United States and $372,712,000 from the non-regionals.
Max A. Stolper*
Washington, D.C.
*Max A. Stolper is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and New York and is a
member of the firm of Muir and Stolper, Washington, D.C.
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World Bank
The World Bank, earlier this year, reconsidered its policy towards financing
certain types of projects in the petroleum sector. Previously, the Bank's
financing in this sector had been directed primarily at "downstream" projects,
such as refineries, pipelines, and the like. The Bank had not generally been
willing to consider projects relating to oil exploration or production.
The basis for the Bank's previous policy had been that sufficient private
capital was available for oil exploration and production projects. In addition, in
those instances where private capital was not available, the projects did not
meet the Bank's tests for economic viability due to the high cost of oil in relation
to the world market price of oil.
As a consequence of the substantial increase in world market prices for oil in
recent years, the economic viability of producing oil in many less developed
countries has improved and projects which were previously not viable may be so
now. In addition, the Bank appears to believe that financing from sources
other than the Bank is not readily available for oil production projects in less
developed countries. This is presumably the result of increased political risks.
Consequently, the Bank is now willing to consider financing oil production
projects in less developed countries. But the Bank is still not willing to finance
oil exploration. Its current position is that oil production projects will be con-
sidered for Bank financing if economically viable and if capital from other
sources is not available. As of the present time, no such projects have in fact
been financed by the Bank. However, with its change in attitude toward these
projects, it is expected that the Bank will finance such projects in the future.
Jerome P. Akman*
Washington, D.C.
*Jerome P. Akman is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and Maryland and an
associate in the firm of Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn.
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Export-Import Bank of the United States
Over the past few months, Eximbank has been reducing the amount of its
direct lending, in part as the result of circumstances, but largely as the result
of policy decisions at the Bank and in the United States Government.
Encouraging this trend, among other things, is the fact that Exim will be back
under the United States budget as of October 1 (so that its loan disbursements
will appear as budget expenses), the renewed effort of the Bank under
President DuBrul to avoid Bank financing unless other funds are
demonstrably not available, that Exim's rates (8-1/4 - 9-1/2%) are at or near
market levels, and that it has increased its other charges. The Bank welcomes
the reduction in its new lending, with President DuBrul's statement, "Small is
beautiful." The Bank is more and more frequently declining to lend for large
projects, pushing borrowers to commercial lenders, often with Eximbank
guarantees (which are not budget disbursements). It is not yet clear how this
policy will apply to projects in the $5-20 million range.
Although Exim's total authorizations for FY 1976 were, at $8.6 billion,
some $300 million higher than in FY 1975, there was a drop of $400 million to
$2.1 billion in the amount of direct loans. Increases were almost entirely in the
insurance programs which were up $600 million.
Another major policy change, in credit terms, was announced by Exim in
June, on a one-year trial basis. Although the announcement was unilateral,
government export credit institutions in other major creditor countries made
similar announcements thereafter. Under these announcements, the creditor
institutions volunteered to set floors on blended interest rates (combined
official and commercial) in a range of 7-1/2 to 8% on over-five-year credits,
and of 7-1/4 to 7-3/4% on two-to-five-year credits, the floor rate in each
category being determined by the income level of the borrower's country. The
institutions also announced a 15% minimum down payment requirement, a
significant increase for Exim, where 10% down payments had been common.
Exim also plans to give advance notice to its major counterparts abroad of the
terms of proposed over-five-year credits to developed country borrowers. The
new guidelines do not apply to aircraft, ships, power plants credits and some
other categories.
Walter Sauer, Exim's No. 2 man since 1962, has resigned after thirty years
with the bank. He has been succeeded as Vice Chairman and First Vice
President by Delio E. Gianturco, a thirteen-year bank employee-officer.
Stephen B. Ives, Jr.*
*Stephen B. Ives, Jr. is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and Rhode Island and a
partner in the firm of Wald, Harkrader & Ross in Washington, D.C. From 1968 to 1970, he was
General Counsel to the U.S. Agency for International Development.
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Reform in International Monetary Discipline
I. Introduction
In a report issued to the Board of Governors of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) on June 14, 1974 by the Ad Hoc Committee on Reform of the
International Monetary System and Related Issues, the Committee attached an
Outline ofReform. The Outline specified some steps for immediate consideration
by the IMF, including the preparation of draft amendments of the Articles of
Agreement of the IMF.
The Executive Directors of the IMF considered possible draft amendments and
the results were discussed in Kingston, Jamaica, at a meeting of the Interim
Committee of the Board of Governors on the International Monetary System, in
effect, the successor to the Ad Hoc Committee on Reform referred to above.
The Interim Committee, in its Communique issued January 8, 1976,
"welcomed the agreement that had been reached on provisions concerning the
important problems of exchange rates. In this respect, it has endorsed the new
Article IV of the Articles of Agreement which establish a system of exchange ar-
rangements. The new system recognizes an objective of stability in economic and
financial factors."
The present article focuses on the important change in international monetary
discipline embraced by this shift from the fixed exchange rate requirements that
had been embodied in the original Articles of Agreement, the "Bretton Woods
System." Briefly, it seeks to compare the highlights of the international legal
obligations embraced in the fixed rate system* with members' legal obligations
under the proposed system.
H. The "Bretton Woods" Exchange Rate Discipline
A. Specific Obligations
Under the original Articles, a member was required to establish with the
IMF a par value for its currency, directly or indirectly, in terms of gold. Spot
exchange transactions between the currencies of members taking place within
their territories were required not to differ from parity by more than one percent.
Each member was required to take appropriate measures to ensure that all
exchange transactions between its currency and the currencies of other members
took place within the one-percent margin from parity. A member that freely
bought and sold gold in settlement of its foreign obligations within the prescribed
*This paper does not deal with other specific obligations regarding members' exchange rate
arrangements contained in the Articles, e.g., (1) prohibition of restrictions on payments and
transfers for current international transactions, (2) multiple currency practices, and (3) discriminat-
ing currency arrangements without IMF approval. Those interdictions continue without change in
the Articles as proposed to be amended.
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margins for gold transactions was deemed to be fulfilling that obligation. The
United States, until August 15, 1971, stated that it was freely buying and selling
gold to settle its international transactions and therefore was not required by the
Articles to take any additional measures to ensure that exchange rates between
the United States dollar and other members' currencies took place within the
prescribed margins. A member that did not maintain exchange rates for its
currency within the prescribed margins, described as a "floating" currency, was
not acting in conformity with the Articles. While the IMF could approve other
deviations from the margin requirements, for example, multiple currency
practices, it had no power to approve a unitary fluctuating rate.
A normal method that a member with a market economy would use to ensure
conformity with the margin requirements was for its monetary authorities to
intervene in the foreign exchange market by using its reserves, typically, United
States dollars. By such intervention, the exchange rate for members' currency
was prevented from falling more than one percent below parity or from rising
more than one percent above parity.
Except for changes in par value that did not exceed ten percent of the initial par
value, proposals for changes were subject to Fund concurrence and the
satisfaction of three conditions:
1. the proposal of the member for a change had to correct a fundamental
disequilibrium;
2. a change in par value could be made only on the proposal of the member;
and
3. a member proposing change was required to consult with the IMF prior to
a change.
B. General Obligations
In addition to the specific obligations referred to above, the Articles provided
some general obligations. Article IV, Section (a), reads as follows:
(a) Each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund to promote exchange
stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, and to
avoid competitive exchange alterations.
HI. Breakdown of the "Bretton Woods System"
The fixed rate system established at Bretton Woods accompanied the
tremendous expansion of world trade and payments in the post-war years and was
also blessed with orderly exchange arrangements for the major part of world trade
and payments. The story of the breakdown of the fixed rate system starting
during a period in 1971 and the generalized floating continuously since March
1973 has often been told. The causes of the breakdown and need for reform were
amply set forth by the IMF in the Ad Hoc Committee's Outline of Reform
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referred to above. Suffice it to say, the IMF has concluded that the specific legal
obligations of members regarding their exchange system embodied in the Articles
could not ensure one of the chief objectives of the system, namely, exchange
stability.
Members that suffered strong deficits in their balance of payments did not
always take timely and adequate measures to shore-up confidence in their
currencies. The exchange rates for their currencies, accordingly, declined
vis-a-vis the currencies of members that enjoyed strong surpluses. The latter
resulted, of course, in increasing confidence in the currencies of the surplus
countries and a resultant increase in the exchange rates of those currencies.
Exacerbating the situation frequently were the activities of speculators who would
transfer from weak currencies to strong ones, further driving down the rates for
weak currencies and driving up rates for the strong ones. Indeed, market forces
thus frequently had an extraordinary impact on the direction in which exchange
rates moved beyond what otherwise would have resulted from the normal flows of
currencies in international trade and payments.
For their part, the member countries, except for those that freely bought and
sold gold, were required without limit and without exception to intervene in the
foreign exchange market to keep exchange rates within the prescribed margins.
On certain critical occasions, the monetary authorities in some countries were
obliged to intervene to the extent of over $1 billion (equivalent) in a single day in
order to maintain exchange rates within the prescribed margins.
It was not always clear whether, at times of crisis these violent fluctuations in
exchange rates were the consequence of inadequate restraining policies on the
part of the deficit country whose exchange rate was weak, or inadequate expan-
sionary policies on the part of a surplus country whose exchange rate was strong,
or both. The certainty, however, was that there was inadequate coordination of
monetary policies among the member countries to avoid the resultant exchange
instability, and, indeed, the ultimate abandonment in 1973 of adherence to a
fixed exchange rate discipline.
As will be seen below, the philosophy of the regime envisaged in the reform is
that, until the international community finds itself amply prepared to undertake
once more the discipline inherent in a fixed exchange rate, members will be free to
choose their respective exchange arrangements, whether they involve floating
rates, fixed rates or arrangements in concert among groups of countries. Under
this approach, with greater coordination of the monetary and related policies of
members under the surveillance of the IMF, the result should be a stable system
of exchange rates.
IV. Discipline Envisaged in the Proposed Amendments
A. General Obligations
The proposed revision in the obligations of members regarding exchange
arrangements may be summarized as follows: the general obligations under the
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original Articles, namely, to collaborate with the IMF and other members to
assure orderly exchange arrangements and to provide a stable system of exchange
rates would continue. In addition, the Articles will provide that:
In particular, each member shall:
(i) endeavor to direct its economic and financial policies toward the objective of fos-
tering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to
its circumstances;
(ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial
conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disrup-
tions;
(iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order
to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair com-
petitive advantage over other members; and
(iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this Section.
B. General Exchange Arrangements
Each member is to notify the IMF of the exchange arrangements it intends to
apply and of any changes in its exchange arrangements. The arrangements may
be (i) for a fixed rate, that is, the maintenance by a member of a value for its
currency in terms of a denominator, or (ii) cooperative arrangements by which
members maintain values for their currencies in relation to each other, or (iii)
other exchange arrangements, e.g., floating rates, that is, without a requirement
that the value of a member's currency be maintained at a given rate.
C. Surveillance Over Exchange Arrangements
Coordination of the monetary policies of members in order to bring about a
system of stable rates is envisaged as taking the following form: the IMF is
required to oversee the monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation
and it is to oversee the compliance of members with the obligations mentioned in
IV(i) above. In this connection, the IMF "shall exercise firm surveillance over the
exchange rate policies of members, and shall adopt specific principles for the
guidance of all members with respect to those policies." The duty of each member
is to provide the IMF with the information necessary for such surveillance, More-
over, the member, if requested, shall be required to consult with the IMF
regarding its exchange rate policies.
V. Major Thrust of the Proposed Discipline
To recapitulate, the principal changes that are to be wrought into the Articles
are:
(a) the freedom of members to choose their exchange rate system;
(b) the surveillance by the IMF of members' exchange rate policies;
(c) the duty of members to consult with the IMF, when requested by the IMF,
on the members' exchange rate policies; and
(d) the international coordination of members' economic and financial
policies.
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The authority in the IMF to initiate consultation with a member regarding
its exchange rate policies and, implicitly, the appropriateness of its exchange
rate, is regarded in some quarters as the most striking change and a much-
needed improvement over the Bretton Woods System. Under the Bretton
Woods System, the IMF was without power to take any formal initiative in
looking toward a change in a member's par value. Changes in par values could
take place only on the proposal of the member and in the eventuality the
member's proposals, when they were made, were late and large. The new system
is designed to produce economic and financial coordination of members'
monetary policies to avoid undue aberations in exchange rates as the result of
inappropriate or inadequate monetary policies on the part of members, those in
surplus as well as those in deficit.
In the view of some critics, the provisions of the proposed amendments
constitute little more than a codification of present practice. The premise
underlying that view is that more specific legal obligations are needed, for
example, with respect to a duty that a member intervene in the foreign exchange
market in prescribed circumstances or to take other specified measures to
ensure the avoidance of erratic exchange rate movements.
On the other hand, a more optimistic view more widely held in other quarters
is that the coordination of monetary practices of members with the IMF estab-
lishing and overseeing principles to be followed by members as circumstances
change, coupled with the new authority in the IMF to require that a member
consult with it regarding the member's exchange policies, augurs well for the
new monetary regime. That regime is designed to afford greater flexibility to
meet given circumstances in substitution of the prescribed rigid rules which
continued to apply irrespective of prevailing circumstances and without neces-
sarily producing exchange stability. A basic premise underlying this view is that
with the IMF's new role in the management of the monetary system, its long
experience in times of exchange stability as well as periods of exchange
instability, and the presence of its ex-officers and others formerly associated
with the IMF now in authoritative positions in their respective countries, a
number of them being ministers of finance or governors of central banks, the
opportunity exists for effective coordination of monetary policies through the
IMF working closely with its members and closer working relations among the
members themselves, sometimes referred to as the "Spirit of Rambouillet."
Under this view, the set of rules embodied in the proposed amendments could




*Albert S. Gerstein is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia and of Counsel to
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan in Washington, D.C. From 1948 to 1975 he served in the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, most recently as Deputy General Counsel.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency
As the international horizons of the atomic energy industry expand in terms
of its technology and potential market, States are relying to a critical extent on
the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to lead
discussion on problem areas emerging and to enforce safeguards.
Since its formation in 1957 in Vienna, pursuant to the terms of the IAEA
Statute, the Agency has demonstrated a flexibility and efficiency suited to the
difficult tasks assigned to it. The Agency's ability to perform its vital functions
and gain the cooperation of a wide range of States in its specific programs can
be attributed to a number of factors including the Agency's unique status and
organizational structure.
Although the IAEA is not, properly speaking, a specialized agency, the
principal difference between it and the other agencies of the United Nations
system, and the degree of autonomy which it thereby enjoys, is that the IAEA
reports directly to the General Assembly rather than to the Economic and Social
Council. This arrangement was the result of an early struggle between the
United States and Soviet Union concerning the potential control of the Agency
by the United Nations Security Council. The present status of the Agency in the
United Nations system reflects the United States position.
Another important distinction between this Agency and most other inter-
governmental agencies lies in the composition of the ruling organ of the Agency,
the Board of Governors. Instead of the usual formula for membership based on
geographical distribution, the IAEA Statute devised a complex scheme to
arrange membership in a manner satisfactory to the have and have-not States
without sacrificing the Board's ability to act in a coordinated and decisive
fashion in achieving its goals. The categories to each of which a set number of
seats is assigned are designated as: (1) most advanced members, including most
advanced in the world and most advanced in each region, (2) other producers of
source materials, (3) supplier of technical assistance, (4) geographic represen-
tatives, and (5) "floaters" elected without designation of geographic areas. The
other organs include the General Conference which is modeled after the United
Nations General Assembly, but given little authority, and the Secretariat which
includes a staff of 400 professionals and 800 general workers who are led by the
Director General in the administration and implementation of the Agency's
various programs.
The IAEA's role as originally conceived was and continues to be a positive one
of encouraging the peaceful use of atomic energy throughout the world. This
position has not hindered the Agency's ability to regulate the industry in terms
of safeguards where requested by States. The Agency was assigned a critical role
in the international effort to deter nuclear proliferation, which led to the United
Nations-sponsored Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to which over a hundred
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States are today parties. Under the terms of the NPT, the Agency applies its
safeguards to nuclear facilities and materials with the cooperation of the vendor
and vendee States in allowing inspection and providing the necessary records. In
1975, the NPT was reviewed at a conference in Geneva to analyze the effective-
ness of the treaty. Generally, satisfaction was expressed with NPT and IAEA's
performance under it; universal adherence to the treaty and to IAEA safeguards
was assigned priority.
The activities of the IAEA are diverse, although its most effective and utilized
program involves the application of IAEA safeguards (as under the NPT) to
ensure that nuclear materials and equipment are not diverted to military pur-
poses. On the safety aspect of atomic energy, the Agency has assumed an in-
creasingly important role in the formulation of standards and codes relating to
safe transport of nuclear materials and operation of nuclear facilities. For
example, the IAEA is now developing guides in the areas of Government
Organization, Siting, Design, Operations, and Quality Assurance which are
especially aimed at the needs of developing states purchasing nuclear power
systems.
The Agency's concern for the needs of developing states is reflected in its
programs for technical cooperation with such States. Under these programs,
experts, equipment and training courses are made available to States for
nuclear power project planning and implementation. The Agency also supplies
nuclear material to developing states; however, this aspect of the IAEA's role in
the field has been limited.
As a quasi-member of the United Nations "family" of intergovernmental
agencies, the IAEA has cooperated with such other international agencies as the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations En-
vironment Program and the United Nations Development Program, in the
furtherance of the safe use and availability of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes. Besides these efforts, the IAEA performs the task of gathering and
disseminating the latest technical information available through the Interna-
tional Nuclear Information System (INIS), a sophisticated computerized
system.
The future role of the IAEA is indicated by the discussions now being
initiated by the Agency in areas such as the transport of nuclear materials and
the disposal of nuclear wastes. Of special interest is the Agency's suggestion of
regional nuclear power facilities to fulfill future energy needs in areas not
appropriate for independent material programs. In such multilateral programs,
the IAEA's presence would be essential to ensure cooperation among participat-
ing States and world security.
The Agency enjoys the endorsement of both developing and developed states.
It was fitting, therefore, that the scene of the Agency's 1976 annual conference,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, was also the subject of one of the most significant recent
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transfers of nuclear technology from developed to developing States, the sale by
West German Companies to Brazil of a nuclear power system.
The most serious threat to the continued effectiveness of the Agency in per-
formance of its present programs such as safeguards, and of new tasks in the
future, appears financial in view of its present budget. There is now, however,
legislation pending before the United States Congress which recognizes this
problem and seeks to alleviate it.
William 0. Doub*
Washington, D.C.
*William 0. Doub is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and Maryland and a
partner in the firm LeBouf, Lamb, Lieby & MacRae. From 1971 to 1974, he was a commissioner on
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and from 1968 to 1971, was chairman of the Maryland Public
Services Commission.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
1. Goal of Completing MTN in 1977 Reaffirmed
An "economic summit" meeting was held in Puerto Rico on June 27 and 28,
1976, at which President Ford played host to the heads of state of Canada,
France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The partici-
pants discussed a number of current developments on the worldwide economic
scene, and, in their closing statement, they reaffirmed the goal of completing
the Geneva multilateral trade negotiations by the end of 1977.
2. United States Presents "Safeguards" Proposal
At the July 19, 1976 meeting of the MTN Safeguard Group, the United
States presented a "concrete paper" outlining the basic elements that the
United States would like to see in a new multilateral safeguards code. Article
XIX of the GATT sets forth the existing rules governing the use of import
restrictions to protect domestic industry against serious injury caused by
increased imports. The United States proposal attempts to lay the groundwork
for development of a more effective and useful international safeguards system
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than the present Article XIX, which often has been circumvented by countries
imposing protectionist measures.
The United States proposal stresses the need for an "open" or "transparent"
safeguard system, under which all interested parties would have the oppor-
tunity to make their views concerning the need for import protection known.
Import relief would be temporary, and would be phased out over the period of
its effectiveness. The United States paper suggests that tariff compensation and
retaliation (as provided in GATT Article XIX) would not be necessary or per-
mitted under the new code. Countries that did not subscribe to the code,
however, would continue to be subject to the GATT Article XIX provisions.
The United States proposal, which advances an approach similar to the
import relief procedures presently used in the United States, was submitted to
stimulate discussion of a new safeguard formula. Negotiations on the proposal
are expected to begin early in 1977.
3. EEC Offers Tariff-Cutting Formula
On July 7, 1976, the EEC presented a proposed tariff-cutting formula, based
on a "harmonization" approach, which emphasizes negotiating tariffs to more
or less uniform rates, with the greatest reductions being made in the highest
tariffs. The EEC proposal suggests that tariffs be reduced by their own amounts
-e.g., a 10 percent duty by 10 percent-and that this formula be applied to
each duty four times over an extended period. This would reduce a 20 percent
tariff to about 10 percent and a 50 percent duty to about 13 percent. The pro-
posal would not apply to agricultural products, which the EEC considers a
matter for negotiation by the MTN Agricultural Group, rather than the Tariff
Group. The question whether agricultural products should be considered
separately in the MTN negotiations, or along with liberalization of industrial
trade, continues to divide the United States and the EEC.
While United States negotiators welcomed the EEC proposal as a positive
step, they criticized the proposal's exemption of agricultural products, which is
the area in which the EEC applies its higher duties. The United States also
considers that the EEC formula would not lead to sufficient across-the-board
reductions in the five to fifteen percent duty range, where the majority of inter-
national trade takes place.
Bilateral GATT Issues
1. United States "DISC" Tax Treatment Challenged in GATT
The GATT Council has convened a "panel of conciliation" to consider a
complaint filed by the EEC against the United States DISC tax provisions and a
countercomplaint filed by the United States against certain tax practices of
three EEC member countries. The EEC contends that the DISC ("Domestic
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International Sales Corporation") provisions, which permit deferral of taxation
of a portion of a DISC's export sales earnings, have the effect of providing an
export subsidy, in contravention of GATT Article XVI4. The United States
contends that the DISC tax deferral does not amount to a forgiveness of taxes,
and that it is not a subsidy within Article XVI. The United States further has
argued that if the DISC is a prohibited export subsidy, the practices of Belgium,
France and the Netherlands in exempting foreign source income from taxation
(including income from sales of exports through foreign subsidiaries) are even
more clearly prohibited export subsidies.
The five-member panel of experts, meeting in Geneva, heard an oral presen-
tation of the complaints of the parties on March 15, 1976. (Canada also argued
against the DISC, as an "interested party.") Briefs were filed by the parties at
the end of April, and further oral arguments were made before the panel at the
end of June. The decision of the panel, which has indicated it will issue separate
opinions on each of the four measures complained of, is expected sometime this
fall.
2. United States Specialty Steel Quotas
In January, following hearings in an "escape clause" proceeding, the United
States International Trade Commission recommended that quantitative limita-
tions be imposed on United States imports of specialty steel (stainless steel and
alloy tool steel). On June 11, 1976, the United States and Japan concluded an
"orderly marketing agreement" limiting Japanese exports of these products to
the United States to specified quotas over the next three years. Efforts by the
United States Government to negotiate similar agreements with European coun-
tries were unsuccessful, and on June 14, 1976 the United States imposed uni-
lateral restraints on imports of specialty steel from other foreign suppliers for a
three-year period. Under the Presidential Proclamation imposing the restraints,
specific allocations of quotas (by item) are provided for Japan, the EEC,
Canada and Sweden, with a residual quota allocation for each item being
applicable to all other suppliers. (Proclamation No. 4445; 41 Fed. Reg. 24101.)
The Presidential action was taken pursuant to authority contained in Section
203 of the Trade Act of 1974.
At the June 14, 1976 GATT Council meeting, Council members generally
criticized the United States import controls on specialty steels as being unwar-
ranted. No formal complaint was presented against the United States, although
a number of participants, including the EEC and Canada, reserved their rights
to take future GATT action.
3. United States Drops Automobile Antidumping Investigation
A major source of tension between the United States and its industrialized
trading partners was removed when the United States Treasury Department
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announced, on May 4, 1976, that it was discontinuing its antidumping investi-
gation against automobile manufacturers in Europe, Canada and Japan.
Although Treasury found that most foreign manufacturers were selling their
cars in the United States at prices below their home market prices, the anti-
dumping proceeding was dropped in return for assurances of corrective action
by the manufacturers. An element in the Treasury Department's decision may
have been potential difficulty in proving that domestic car manufacturers were
injured by the foreign producers' pricing practices, since sales of United
States-manufactured automobiles have been strong.
Stephen Gibson*
Washington, D.C.
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Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
Developments within CMEA indicate that continued priority will be given to
measures furthering economic integration of its member nations. At the
thirtieth session of the CMEA countries, held in Berlin July 7-9, 1976, Mr.
Kosygin emphasized the importance of working out common progams for
achieving long-term goals in vital economic sectors. The communique issued
after the session included raw materials, energy, engineering, consumer goods
and transport among those sectors. In this connection, the International Invest-
ment Bank (liB), the USSR Foreign Trade Bank (Vneshtorgbank) and the
banks of other CMEA member countries have been cooperating in financing the
creation on Soviet territory of additional facilities for the production of oil,
natural gas, iron ore, ferrous metals, ferro-alloys, asbestos and other raw
materials. Such cooperation, particularly in the raw material and energy
sectors, should serve to strengthen the influence of the USSR upon other
member countries. In a press interview, the Chairman of the Board of Vnesh-
torgbank described cooperation with CMEA member countries in implementa-
tion of the comprehensive program of integration of the socialist economies as
the main trend in the Bank's activity.
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An interesting development is the growing contact between United Nations
agencies and organs of CMEA. A representative of the United Nations Europ-
ean Economic Commission (ECE) took part in the April, 1976 session of the
CMEA Chemical Industry Permanent Commission, which discussed the pre-
paration of long-term target plans to 1990 and integration measures. Also, the
1975 annual report of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC)
reports progress in developing business contacts with the Bank for International
Settlement, the UNCTAD and the ECE. In addition, several Unitad Nations
agencies (ECE, UNCTAD and UNESCO) were represented at a recent con-
ference on East-West cooperation held in Dresden under the auspices of the
International Economic Association.
One of the topics considered at that conference was the role of "production
trading" as a form of compensation for the Western investor in large-scale,
long-term projects in CMEA member countries. This approach to financing
East-West trade was also discussed in a recent IBEC bulletin and was the
subject of a paper read by a Soviet participant at the January, 1976 meeting of
the legal committee of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, Inc.
Clearly, production trading arrangements best accommodate the financial
limitations and economic needs of CMEA members, and Western firms capable
of making such arrangements will continue to enjoy a competitive edge over
firms that insist upon more conventional financing. However, Western firms
selling complete factories and installations in Eastern Europe and making a
commitment to accept partial payment in goods produced have been criticized
for exposing domestic industry to unfair competition from low priced goods and
threatening the jobs of domestic workers. The criticism applies more strongly to
compensation arrangements resulting in the import of Eastern European
finished goods than to arrangements leading to the import of scarce raw mate-
rials. The problem was raised by a Belgian representative in a written question
to the European Commission, which replied that the European Community
cannot interfere in private contracts but noted that imports from Eastern
Europe are subject to the regulations implementing EEC commercial policy and
that the Community can take appropriate steps to protect its interests.
The short-range prospects for an agreement between the European Com-
munity and CMEA are in serious doubt. The Community's experts have been
studying the CMEA draft of an agreement, which was submitted during a
February, 1976 meeting in Luxembourg. Their analysis has been described as so
cautious as to give cause to wonder whether there is in fact common ground for
negotiations. The fundamental problem lies in the diverse nature of the EEC
and CMEA, the former being a highly integrated customs union with supra-
national institutions empowered to act for its members while the latter prides
itself on the absence of supranational organs and implicitly concedes that
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economic integration is still only a goal. The CMEA draft provides for an agree-
ment between CMEA and its members and the EEC and its members, ignoring
the difference between the two organizations. The EEC would favor negotiation
of separate agreements between the EEC Commission and each individual
CMEA member with an umbrella agreement between CMEA and the EEC
recognizing the authority of the CMEA Secretariat in areas where economic and
political integration has actually been achieved. Such negotiations would
require that CMEA recognize the authority of the EEC Commission to speak for
the EEC member countries, while the CMEA members would be negotiating
unilaterally. The controversy over the structure of an agreement has political
overtones, of course. The Eastern European Bloc has never recognized the
legitimacy of the EEC but has frequently castigated it as the economic arm of
NATO. If individual CMEA members are obliged to negotiate with the EEC as
a whole, the result may be the economic and political division of CMEA. Any
weakening of the economic cohesiveness of the Eastern Bloc and its orientation
toward the Soviet Union would be resisted by the latter, particularly if political
consequences are foreseen. While Soviet interests are served by Bloc to Bloc
negotiations, the EEC is reluctant to take steps to undercut whatever political
and economic autonomy is enjoyed by the smaller CMEA members and, in its
own economic interest, fears any agreement that might permit domination of
both Eastern and Western Europe by the USSR.
Besides those general concerns, the EEC experts have numerous economic
objections to the terms of the agreement proposed by CMEA, the most signi-
ficant of which are directed against the proposal that the member nations of
CMEA and the EEC grant each other most favored nation treatment (MFN).
The EEC experts question whether market economy countries can receive
adequate compensation for reducing their tariff barriers against imports from
nations with a planned economy and a state monopoly of foreign trade. Also,
the legal position of the CMEA members has been that no exception to MFN is
possible and that MFN applies not only to tariffs but to all trade matters, in-
cluding the Community's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the Lome
Convention, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the annual EEC quotas for
East European imports and the consolidated lists adopted within the framework
of the GATT. In short, MFN is an undefined term which CMEA views as an all-
encompassing, legally binding obligation but which the EEC views as a narrower,
nonbinding, unilateral concession. An article published during the recent CMEA
session in RudePravo, the Czechoslovak party newspaper, charged that the EEC
is seeking unilateral economic and political advantages in its relations with
CMEA. The two organizations have a long way to go both in resolving substantive
issues and in adjusting mutual perceptions. It is expected that the EEC will
respond to the CMEA draft agreement in October, 1976 and that negotiations
will begin sometime in 1977.
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In the meantime, member nations of the two blocs continue to conclude
bilateral economic cooperation agreements. In March, 1976, France concluded
a five-year intergovernmental economic cooperation agreement with Bulgaria,
and on May 6, 1976, French firms concluded sixteen specific cooperation
agreements with Polish foreign trade agencies. The growth of economic ties
between Western European firms and Eastern European agencies and the
growing economic interdependence of member nations of the EEC and CMEA
provide continuing motivation to find some basis on which an agreement
between the two organizations can be reached.
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